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Gerhard CasperThe astute critic "is the one of whom one can say, with Pguy that
'he knew how to discern the evil that lurks beneath such a semblance
of good'."1 Kurland, reviewing another book by Black in the pages
of this journal, opened with a list of the author's formal accomplishments which was as flattering as when it is emphasized that somebody is a colossus merely in order to suggest that he has feet of
clay.2 However this may be (and it may just be a joy in artistry
shared by Professors Kurland and Black) to the stars then listed in
this law review, Black has now added another one (incidentally, also
possessed by Kurland 3): the distinction of lecturing in a series known
for its outstanding speakers. The above book is the publication of
the Edward Douglass White Lectures which Professor Black delivered at Louisiana State University. Among his predecessors are MacIver, Hutchins, and Corwin. Black's lectures display the same unpretentious, but artful liveliness characteristic of the sculptures which
a visitor sometimes finds on exhibition in his office at the Yale
Law School and which I, for one, can appreciate more than Kurland
4
seems to have appreciated Black's poetry.
Among teachers of constitutional law at American law schools,
Professor Black has perhaps shown most interest in systematic analysis and exposition of the role played by constitutional law in the
American polity. Black wrote one of the most literate contributions
to the lively debate on judicial epistemology which characterized
t- Professor of Law and Political Science, The University of Chicago.
1 N. LEITES, THE RuLEs OF THE GAME IN PARIS 286 (1969).
2 Kurland, Book Review (C. BLACK, TIE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW

(1963)), 32 U. CrI. L. REv. 386 (1965).
3 Professor Kurland recently gave the Cooley Lectures at Michigan. Kurland and Black
also share the prestige of each having written a Harvard Law Review Foreword (on essentially the same topic). Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. Rav. 143 (1964);
Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARv. L. Rlv. 69 (1967).
4 See Kurland, supra note 2, at 388.
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the late fifties and early sixties in the United States.5 He is also
the author of the most incisive short treatment of constitutional
law presently available. 6 As concerns the latter work, it is difficult
to fully understand, as may be expected of a 118-page text on constitutional law. In particular, the reader all too easily overlooks the
implications of an argument made in a very few sentences. Thus, I
realized only now, when rereading the booklet on the occasion of
this review, the importance for Black of a point on which Structure
and Relationship in ConstitutionalLaw elaborates:
Up to now we have considered constitutional limitations as
rooting in particular textual provisions ("freedom of speech,"
"due process of law"). There is another possible source of such
protection, as yet quite undeveloped in decision. Like congressional and presidential powers, limitations may sometimes
arise by implication from the nature and structure of our
polity. The slight development till now of this branch of the
law may be due to a preference in our juristic style for the
"interpretation" of indubitably authentic commands, rather
than the discernment of implications. But this stylistic preference may change.7
At the end of his Louisiana lectures Professor Black said: "Still,
I think it is right that the method of inference from structures, status,
and relationship is relatively little attended to in our legal culture, and
even if I buy a pocket book in the station in New Orleans and read
on the way home almost everything I have said here, I shall not
be sorry for having raised some of these problems in your minds.""
Such a pocket book exists. Its author is Professor Black.
Black's main point is this. In dealing with questions of constitutional
law, purported explication of the particular textual passage which is
considered as a directive for action has all too much dominated
constitutional interpretation.9 Though the disadvantages of this
method and the advantages of inference from structure are never systematically spelled out in the book, the disadvantages of mere textual
exegesis include: it misses "the real question"' 0 and thus constitutes
"poor rhetoric""; it avoids "policy" and "the discussion of practical
5

C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE CoURT (1960).

6 C. BLAcK, PmsERECriVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

7 P. 83.
8 Pp. 93-94.
9 P. 7.
10 Pp. 13, 49.
11 P. 57.
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rightness"' 2 (and thus impedes the development of constitutional
law); it does not provide certainty and thus creates hazards for civil
rights; 13 and, most of all, mere textual interpretation fails to grasp the
implications of national citizenship for American federalism, or, as
Professor Black puts it rather awkwardly, "the intercommunicating
14
polity that is the United States."'
It is apparent from Professor Black's opening paragraph, but even
more so from the language he uses, that the author does not refuse
Llewellyn's baton to which Kurland said he was entitled. 15 Rather,
he wields it lovingly, and certainly without an objection from me.
The core of this relationship is not so much that Black seems to be
issuing a call for using the Grand Tradition in the determination of
constitutional issues. The affinity is more subtle. To draw inferences
from the structures and relationships created by the Constitution is
to emphasize the "type-situation" and make "the nature of things"
the basis for legal argument. Llewellyn, in turn, was, of course, influenced, as he himself pointed out, by German legal theory, in particular Levin Goldschmidt.' 6 Since Black does not claim novelty of
his ideas, these observations are, of course, not to be taken as criticism
but rather as an attempt at understanding. As concerns novelty, a
"civilian"-to use Black's own category' 7-will hardly be startled by
any of the suggestions Black makes; he will, however, be more skeptical as concerns the value of the method advocated by Black. With
great deference and all the respect I have for Professor Black, one
criticism concerning the "novelty" point seems in order. Anybody
familiar with American legal literature of the first third of this
century cannot fail but be impressed by the interest displayed by
Holmes, Cardozo, Llewellyn-to name but an arbitrary few-in legal
writing and theory abroad. Francois G6ny, for instance, was well
known to the author of The Nature of the Judicial Process. Now,
after his major work on interpretation has become available in an
12 P. 23.
13 "I for one can sleep sounder if I do not have to force my conviction that the states
are barred from interfering with political speech through the narrow verbal funnel of due
process of law." Pp. 45-46.
14 P. 50 & passim.
15 Kurland, supra note 2, at 387.
16 K. LwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON 122 (1960). On Llewellyn's rediscovery
of the ancient doctrine of natura rerum and the context in which I would place it, see
G. CASPER, JURISTISCHER REALISMUS UND POLITISCHE THEORIE iSM AMERIKANIScHEN REcHTsDENKEN 64-66 (1967). Llewellyn's rediscovery occurs simultaneously with a short-lived postwar emphasis on Natur der Sache in German legal philosophy. In the end the discussion
did not prove very fruitful. Its beginning may be traced to an elegant small essay by G.
RADBRUCH, DIE NATuR DER SACHE AIS JUarICHE DENEFORM (1948).
'7 P. 4.
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excellent English edition prepared under the auspices of the Louisiana Law Institute, what G~ny has to say about "the postulate that
social relations or, more generally, the fact elements of any legal system, carry in themselves their own conditions of equilibrium and so
to speak indicate themselves the norms to govern them,"' 8 seems to
be all but ignored.
Before I proceed any further I should like to make clear that I often
find myself in agreement with Black's views on specific constitutional
issues. In particular, I regret, as he does, the lack of emphasis on the
status of citizenship and what this status may involve.19 Rather more
critical than Black,20 I think there is something affirmatively wrong
with invoking the commerce clause as a contrived justification for
Title 2 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, instead of squarely facing the
claims toward equality raised by black citizens. I support Gunther
when he characterizes what Black calls "bad rhetoric" 21 as "demeaning,"22 though I realize that my differences with Black on this point
may be mostly and "merely" verbal. I, too, have been dissatisfied with
the lack of structural considerations, for instance, in last term's Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Rhodes23 where the status of
political parties is dealt with by using the category of the right to vote
and associate "effectively." 2 4 But when all this is said I remain rather
unconvinced that, in this book (as distinguished from his Harvard
Law Review Foreword25), Professor Black has made a persuasive case
for the method he advocates.
The first example Black provides of the difference between textual
interpretation and inference from structure is the case of Carrington
v. Rash26 in which the Supreme Court ordered the admission of an
enlisted serviceman, a bona fide resident, to the franchise in El
Paso, Texas, contrary to a Texas constitutional provision barring
18 F. GtNY, MLTHODE D'INTERPR.rArION rr Soucs EN DROIT Pamv. Posrrre 362 (1963)
(English translation under this title).
19 See Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REV.
89, 122.
20 P. 55.
21 P. 57.
22 Letter to the Department of Justice, dated June 5, 1963, and reprinted in N. DOWLMNG
g- G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307-8 (1965).
23 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
24 See my forthcoming article Williams v. Rhodes and Public Financing of Political
Parties under the American and German Constitutions, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. -. This article
also provides an example of a highly unsatisfactory use of structural and relational considerations by the German constitutional court in dealing with public financing of political parties.
25 Black, supra note 3.
26 380 US. 89 (1965).
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soldiers from voting anywhere but in the county where they resided
previous to their service. The Court found the heart of the matter in
a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Black considers this argument to be beside the point since the classification was reasonable. "The real question is whether we think
Texas, reasonably or not, should be allowed to annex a disability
solely to federal military service." 27 Black, thus, would prefer the
following reasoning resulting in the same outcome:
Carrington, I should rather have said, was a federal soldier,
recruited by the national government to perform a crucial
national function. Conceding that in every other way he
qualified to vote, Texas said that, solely upon the showing
that he was in the performance of that function, he was not
to vote. It makes little difference whether you call that a
penalization of membership in the national Army. It is, in
neutral terminology, the imposition, by a state, of a distinctive disadvantage based solely on membership in the Army.
My thought would be that it ought to be held that no state
may annex any disadvantage simply and solely to the perfor28
mance of a federal duty.

The crux of the matter is in this last sentence. Texas did not annex
the disadvantage "simply and solely" to the performance of a federal
duty, but offered the reasons recited by Black: soldiers are subject
to special pressures, they might take over small communities, they
often are "transients." I think, even if we rely on the "logic of national structure" as the ground for decision, that "logic" calls for
exactly the same weighing of "reasonableness" which the Court does
under the fourteenth amendment. Thus we are hardly better off than
we were before, except that we would have a ground for decision
even if there were no fourteenth amendment-admittedly, an elegant didactic stipulation, and thus may have a somewhat more satisfactory rationale generally.
Black here and elsewhere in the book overemphasizes the difference
between "textual exegesis" and derivation from structure and relation. Most of his arguments on the preponderance of national
policies are indeed based on "textual" interpretation: the difference
is that Professor Black looks at the Constitution in its entirety,
rather than at isolated concepts or rules. In short, the difference is
not so much one between textual and non-textual modes of interpretation, as between interpretation which is oriented toward single
27 P. 13.
28 Pp. 10-11.
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rules on the one hand, and what I would call systematic interpretation,
on the other (for which a much maligned example is provided by
9 ). As concerns the
Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. ConnecticutO
desirability of systematic interpretation (which must also take into
account actual structural changes, as, for instance, those concerning
the function of the electoral college), I would say "it is only a necessity." To this extent, I am in complete agreement with Professor
Black, and rather grateful that he made the point. Black says: "I
submit that the generalities and ambiguities are no greater when
one applies the method of reasoning from structure and relation." 30
With this statement I equally agree, but then it must also be emphasized that there hardly will be any less ambiguities, 31 except, perhaps,
if one shares Black's rather unfailing preference for the "highest possible national interest" as a criterion for distinguishing between what
32
is worthy and what is unworthy of constitutional protection.
This brings me to my last point. In the third of his lectures (the
second is devoted to an intriguing analysis of the status of citizenship
if there were no fourteenth amendment), Black discusses the impact
of structural considerations on the practice of judicial review, more
specifically he justifies the constitutional legitimacy (as distinguished
from their wisdom) of the Supreme Court decisions in the area of
criminal procedure. With the outcome of Professor Black's reasoning
I shall not take issue. Nor do I disagree with his proposition that
"the logic of Marbury v. Madison . . . cannot be relevant to the at-

titude one is to assume toward review of the actions of the states for
their federal constitutionality. For the modes of legitimation are
entirely different." 33 Finally, I think Professor Black is right in emphasizing the fact, "that virtually all intense political trouble about
the Court's role in the last three decades concerns its functioning in
the one of these roles whose legitimacy is not so much as fairly debatable."3 4 Rather, I am somewhat troubled by what I would consider
excessive formalism when he emphasizes that the Court ought to
feel not the slightest embarrassment about its work of reviewing state
acts for their federal constitutionality. 35 The author somewhat qualifies this rather sweeping statement when later he writes that though
29 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30 Pp. 80-31.

31 See the example I refer to in note 24 supra.
32 p. 47 in a discussion of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33 P. 73. Black finds the legitimation for review of state actions in a rather textual
analysis of article VI of the Constitution.
34 P. 75.
35 p. 75.
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the state legislatures are not entitled to the same deference as Congress, "the fully formal action of a state legislature has a considerable
weight; it represents the best and most authentic judgment of the
state as a political body." "But," Black continues, "a great deal of
the review performed by the Court . . . does not concern such acts
at all, but rather places the Court in confrontation with minor state
officialdom." 3 6
Let me first make a structural point. To the extent to which the
states possess legislative competence, it could fairly be argued that
they are entitled to the same "deference" which, Black admits, is
Congress' due. The existence of a countervailing national policy is
the very thing which has to be proven to the state constituency. As
concerns the distinction between actions of state officials (without
more) and practices of state officials authorized by state law, it most
certainly is an important distinction as we know from rich experiences,
yet that distinction is more difficult to make than Black seems to
think. To point to legislative passivity can hardly be the full answer to
the question whether, for example, police interrogation without counsel
is authorized by state law. The very intensity of the political trouble
which the Court has generated seems to be as good a measure as any
of the ambiguity of the textual, structural, relational, and political
data which need to be interpreted, and which Professor Black has
approached with refreshing unorthodoxy. Alas, "it is easier to construct an imaginary figure of precision than it is to perform an act of
37
precision."
36

pp. 87-88.

3"t N.

LErrEs, supra note 1, at 349.

